Passive, Sensory-Enhanced Searches: Shifting the Fourth Amendment  Reasonableness  Burden by McKnight, T. Wade
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 59 | Number 4
Symposium on Harmless Error - Part I
Summer 1999
Passive, Sensory-Enhanced Searches: Shifting the
Fourth Amendment "Reasonableness" Burden
T. Wade McKnight
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
T. Wade McKnight, Passive, Sensory-Enhanced Searches: Shifting the Fourth Amendment "Reasonableness" Burden, 59 La. L. Rev. (1999)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol59/iss4/8
Passive, Sensory-Enhanced Searches: Shifting the Fourth
Amendment "Reasonableness" Burden
I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to the American Revolution, writs of assistance gave English soldiers
and customs agents unlimited authority to enter the private residences and
storehouses of American colonists to conduct arbitrary searches for smuggled
goods.' In 1761, these writs and similar "general" warrants sparked a famous
debate in Boston which arguably marked the beginning of the American
Revolution.2 In this debate, James Otis asserted that writs of assistance were "the
worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty and
the fundamental principles of law, that ever was found in an English law-book."'
With this oppression still fresh in the memories of many of its members, the
First Congress adopted the Fourth Amendment4 which provides in part that "[tihe
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated."' The language
of the Amendment demonstrates that Congress "only intended to restrain the
abuse,... [but] not abolish the power. Hence it is only unreasonable searches
and seizures that are forbidden."' Congress did not, however, define the terms
"search" and "unreasonable." This task has been left to the courts.
Part II of this comment briefly reviews some of the principal cases in which
the United States Supreme Court has analyzed Fourth Amendment search and
seizure issues. In addition to demonstrating how the Court's definition of "search"
has evolved, these cases illustrate the tests used by the Court in evaluating whether
a particular search is "reasonable."
Part III discusses problems encounteredwhen these tests of "reasonableness"
are applied to the passive, sensory-enhanced technology7 used by law enforce-
Copyright 1999, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
I. See Black's Law Dictionary 1609 (6th ed. 1990) ("writs of assistance").
2. John Adams called this debate "the first scene of the first act of opposition to the arbitrary
claims of Great Britain. Then and there the child Independence was born." Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 625, 6 S. Ct. 524, 529 (1886).
3. James Otis' Speech Against the Writs of Assistance (Feb. 24, 1761), In 2 The Works of
John Adams, app. A. 521, 523 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1850). (There is no known formal
record of James Otis' arguments. See I Documents of American History, -to 1898, at 45 (Henry
Steele Commager & Milton Cantor eds., 1988). However, John Adams made notes of the speech.
The quoted material is from John Adams' account of this historic debate.).
4. "The well-known historical purpose of the Fourth Amendment, directed against general
warrants and writs of assistance, was to prevent the use of governmental force to search a man's
house, his person, his papers, and his effects, and to prevent their seizure against his will.". Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 463, 48 S. CL 564, 567 (1928).
5. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
6. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 641,6 S. Ct. 524, 538 (1886) (Miller, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
7. The term "sensory-enhancement," as used in this comment, refers to the use of any object
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ment for surveillance. To illustrate these problems, this part focuses on a
relatively new method of passive, sensory-enhanced surveillance, thermal
imagery, and explains how its use has been inconsistently and improperly
analyzed by the federal courts of appeals.Part IV proposes a new standard for the evaluation of passive,
sensory-enhanced searches under the Fourth Amendment. The analysis
currently used by the courts when evaluating the constitutionality of these
searches places the burden of proof on the citizen. This comment
proposes that the courts abandon their current rationales and shift the
burden back to the government to prove that its actions are reasonable.
In addition, this part discusses practical applications of the proposed
standard when applied to more advanced surveillance technology such as
hand-held millimeter wave cameras.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINE
A. Pre-1967 Search and Seizure Doctrine
Early jurisprudence interpreted the Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure
Clause literally and placed primary focus on individual property rights. From
this interpretation, a trespass-based analysis evolved under which there was no
violation of the Fourth Amendment unless there had been an official warrantless
search and seizure of the person, his papers, "his tangible material effects or an
actual physical invasion of his house or 'curtilage. "" For example, in Olmstead
v. United States the Court stated that "[t]he amendment itself shows that the
to extend the natural sensory perception of the normal human. This includes enhancement both
within and beyond normal ranges. For example, natural human eyesight is limited to certainbandwidths within the electromagnetic spectrum. Amplification of those bandwidths with a device
such as a telescope is an example of enhancement within normal ranges. In contrast, use of a device
that detects infrared radiation, which is not within the bandwidths of visible light, is an example of
enhancement beyond natural ranges. Although acknowledging that a distinction between the two
types of enhancement exists, this author does not find that the differences are sufficient to compel
different results with respect to "reasonableness" under the Fourth Amendment. (For an argument
that sensory-enhancement should be allowed to amplify senses only within the normal human range
of sensory perception, see Mark J. Kwasowski, ThermalImaging Technology: Should lts Warrantless
Use by Police be Allowed in Residential Searches?, 3 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 393, 409 (1997).).
The term "passive," as used in this comment, refers to the fact that there has been no physical
intrusion. Surveillance using a beeper or bug is an example of an "active" search because the deviceis planted within the area under surveillance and transmits information out to officers who cannot
locate themselves within that area. Another example is when a device such as an X-ray machine is
used to project a beam or ray into the area thus allowing the officers to gather information by
measuring the characteristics of the reflected beam. On the other hand, no such intrusion occurs
during "passive" searches. Surveillance using a parabolic microphone is an example of a "passive"
search. The parabolic microphone does not emit any beams or rays; instead, it passively monitors
the sounds that are emitted from that area.
8. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466, 48 S. Ct. 564, 568 (1928) (emphasis added).
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search is to be of material things-the person, the house, his papers, or his
effects."9
Considering the unsophisticated surveillance equipment available to
government officials in the late 1700s,'0 even this limited textual interpretation
was sufficient to provide adequate protection against government invasion into
the individual's privacy because, once a citizen retreated into his home, he could
be relatively certain the activities conducted there would be shielded from
government scrutiny. However, by the mid 1800s, many cities began forming
police forces" and scientists were making significant technological advances in
the field of electronics." Naturally, law enforcement officers took advantage
of this technology to enhance their methods of surveillance. By 1928, the
Supreme Court faced its first "wiretap" case, Olmstead v. United States, 3 and,
by 1942, its first "bugging" case, Goldman v. United States. 4
When first confronted with these electronic surveillance methods, the
Supreme Court maintained a textual method of interpretation and refused to
apply the concepts of search and seizure to intangibles such as communica-
tions." For example, although the Court found that there was a Fourth
Amendment violation in Silverman v. United States when officers inserted a
"spike mike" into a wall to record a suspect's conversations in another room, it
specifically stated that its decision was "based upon the reality of an actual
intrusion into a constitutionally protected area" and not upon a search or seizure
of the communication itself.'6
However, as technology advanced, the Court's adherence to this trespass-
based, concept of "search" met frequent opposition. Some Justices recognized
that such a limited application was no longer adequate to provide protection
against governmental intrusion. In Lopez v. United States, Justice Brennan,
dissenting, reflected that the Court's "course of decisions, it now seems, has been
outflanked by the technological advances of the very recent past."'" Also, in
9. Id. at 464, 48 S. Ct. at 568 (emphasis added).
10. During this time, telescopes and field glasses were commonly available and were used by
government officials for surveillance.
11. In the United States, the first full-time organized police department was formed in New
York City in 1845. Wilbur R. Miller, Cops and Bobbies at x (1977).
12. In 1877, Emile Berliner developed the first loose-contact transmitter, or microphone,
capable of transmitting voice by wire over long distances. Frederic W. Wile, Emile Berliner: Maker
of the Microphone 79-87 (1926).
13. "The Court was faced with its first wiretap case in 1928, Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 48 S.Ct. 564." Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 50, 87 S. Ct. 1873, 1879 (1967).
14. "The first bugging case reached the Court in 1942 in Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S.
129, 62 S.Ct. 993." Berger, 388 U.S. at 51, 87 S. Ct. at 1879.
15. See Goldman v. United States 316 U.S. 129, 62 S. Ct. 993 (1942); Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 48 S. Ct. 564 (1928).
16. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512, 81 S. Ct. 679, 683 (1961) (emphasis
added).




Berger v. New York, the Court acknowledged that "[flew threats to liberty
exist which are greater than that posed by the use of eavesdropping devic-
es"'' and "[t]he law, though jealous of individual privacy, has not kept
pace with these advances in scientific knowledge."' 9  But, despite the
recognized dangers of electronic surveillance, it wasn't until late 1967,
when the Court heard Katz v. United States, that a majority finally agreed
to abandon the trespass doctrine. 0
B. The Katz Decision
In Katz v. United States, FBI agents attached an electronic listening device
to the outside of a public phone booth frequented by their suspect, Charles Katz.
The product of their surveillance, a recording of Katz's voice as he discussed
illegal wagering, was introduced at trial and resulted in Katz's conviction. 2'
Katz argued on appeal that the telephone booth was a "constitutionally protected
area" and therefore the recording obtained via the warrantless search was a
violation of his right to privacy.22 Thus, he asserted that the illegally obtained
information should be inadmissible as evidence against him.23
The Court objected to Katz's formulation of the issue and stated that "the
correct solution of Fourth Amendment problems is not necessarily promoted by
incantation of the phrase 'constitutionally protected area."'" 4  The Court
declared that such a view "deflect[ed] attention from the problem presented...
For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places., 25  This decision
expressly overruled Olmstead and Goldman with respect to their trespass
doctrines26 and expanded the Court's definition of "search." It interpreted the
Fourth Amendment to provide protection in circumstances where an individual
has a protected privacy interest-even if outside one's home. 7 Therefore, Katz
established as a general rule that "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
18. Berger, 388 U.S. at 63, 87 S. CL at 1885.
19. Id. at 49, 87 S. CL at 1878.
20. "The 'trespass' doctrine... can no longer be regarded as controlling." Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 353, 88 S. Ct 507, 512 (1967).
21. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348-49, 88 S. CL at 509.
22. Id. at 349-50, 88 S. Ct. at 510.
23. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341 (1914) established the "exclusionary
rule" which made unconstitutionally obtained evidence inadmissible in federal prosecutions. Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. CL 1684 (1961) incorporated the Fourth Amendment through theFourteenth Amendment thus making the "exclusionary rule" applicable in state prosecutions as well.
24. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350, 88 S. CL at 510.
25. Id. at 351, 88 S. Ct. at 511.
26. "The 'trespass' doctrine.., can no longer be regarded as controlling." Id. at 353, 88 S.
CL at 512.
27. "Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free from unreasonable
searches and seizures." Id. at 359, 88 S. CL at 515.
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protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible
to the public, may be constitutionally protected.""
In Justice Harlan's oft-quoted concurrence, a two-part test was proposed to
determine whether a protected privacy interest exists. First, an individual must
exhibit an actual expectation of privacy (subjective). Second, that expectation
must be one that society is willing to recognize as reasonable (objective). 29 To
illustrate the application of the subjective prong of this test, Justice Harlan
explained that "a man's home is, for, most purposes, a place where he expects
privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the 'plain
view' of outsiders arc not 'protected' because no intention to keep them to
himself has been exhibited."" ° On the other hand, under the objective prong of
the test, "conversations in the open would not be protected against being
overheard, for the expectation of privacy under the circumstances would be
unreasonable."'"
C. Katz's Progeny
The two-part test proposed by Justice Harlan has been the starting point for
analysis of Fourth Amendment issues for over 30 years. 2 The discussion below
briefly reviews a few pertinent Supreme Court cases that have utilized the Katz
two-part test and summarizes the doctrines that have developed from these
decisions.
In United States v. Place3 the Court addressed whether a canine-sniff of
luggage in a public place was a search. The Court affirmed that an individual
has a protected privacy interest in the contents of personal luggage. However,
a canine sniff "does not require opening the luggage. It does not expose
noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view....
Thus, the manner in which [this] information is obtained ... is much less
intrusive than a typical search."34 The Court continued to emphasize the non-
intrusive and limited nature of this type of sensory-enhanced search by pointing
out that "the sniff discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a
contraband item. Thus, despite the fact that the sniff tells the authorities
something about the contents of the luggage, the information obtained is
limited.'"'  Also, as a result of this limited disclosure, "the owner of the
28. Id. at 351, 88 S. Ct. at 511 (citations omitted).
29. Id. at 361, 8 S. CL at 516 (Harlan, ., concurring).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. The 1967 Katz decision "marks a watershed in fourth amendment jurisprudence." Anthony
G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L Rev. 349,382 (1974). Katz "is,
of course, now generally recognized as seminal and has rapidly become the basis of a new formula
of fourth amendment coverage." Id. at 383.
33. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983).




property is not subjected to the embarrassment and inconvenience entailed
in less discriminate and -more intrusive investigative methods."36 The
Court knew of no other investigative procedure that was "so limited both
in the manner in which the information [was] obtained and in the content
of the information revealed.. . ."" Thus, the Court concluded that the
use of the trained canine to detect the presence of narcotics in luggage
"did not constitute a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment."3
In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 9 the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") took aerial photographs of Dow Chemical's plant. In this case,
the "EPA was not employing some unique sensory device that, for example,
could penetrate the walls of buildings . . . but rather a conventional, albeit
precise, commercial camera commonly used in mapmaking." 0 The Court
commented that it may well be "that surveillance of private property by using
highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not generally available to the public,
such as satellite technology, might be constitutionally proscribed absent a
warrant. But the photographs here are not so revealing of intimate details as to
raise constitutional concerns.""'
California v. GreenwoodP2 involved the warrantless search and seizure of
garbage bags left at the curb outside the Greenwood home. Applying the Katz
test, the Court stated that the search "would violate the Fourth Amendment only
if respondents manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in their garbage that
society accepts as objectively reasonable."' 3 The Court then held that the
defendants, "having deposited their garbage in an area particularly suited
for public inspection ... for the express purpose of having strangers take
it, ... could have had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the
inculpatory items that they discarded."" Furthermore, the Court stated
that "the police cannot reasonably be expected to avert their eyes from
evidence of criminal activity that could have been observed by any
member of the public"'" because, "what a person knowingly exposes to
the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection."'"
36. Id.
37. Id., 103 S. Ct. at 2644.45.
38. Id., 103 S. CL at 2645.
39. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986).
40. Id. at 238, 106 S. Ct. at 1826-27.
41. Id., 106 S. Ct. at 1827.
42. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 108 S. Ct. 1625 (1988).
43. Id. at 39, 108 S. CL at 1628.
44. Id. at 40-41, 108 S. CL at 1629 (internal citations omitted).
45. Id. at 41, 108 S. CL at 1629.
46. Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88 S. Ct. 507, 511 (1967)).
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III. APPLICATION OF THESE DOCTRINES TO PASSIVE,
SENSORY-ENHANCED SURVEILLANCE
Courts are now being asked to apply the principles of Katz to a new class
of technology: passive, sensory-enhancing electronic surveillance devices. 47
These devices allow law enforcement to collect otherwise unavailable informa-
tion by enhancing the officer's senses. This type of surveillance involves no
physical intrusion. The suspect is normally not even aware that the surveillance
has occurred because the device "passively" measures the natural emissions from
the target such as sound and electromagnetic radiation (visible light, infrared,
millimeter waves, radio waves, etc.). One such device, the thermal imager, has
recently received significant attention in the courts. The focus of this part is on
how the thermal imager is used and how this use has been analyzed under the
two-pronged Katz test.
A. What Is a Thermal Imager and How Is It Used?
A thermal imaging device, often called a "FLIR" (forward-looking infrared
radar), is used to detect differences in temperature on the surface of a selected
target. Once the operator sets a baseline temperature, the device provides a
visual image of objects that are warmer or cooler than the baseline. The cooler
areas are displayed in shades of black and the warmer areas in shades of
white. 8 Current thermal imagers are capable of detecting temperature differ-
ences as small as .0180 Celsius 9 and can locate a human in the dark from over
seven kilometers away." While the FLIR is not capable of seeing through an
object, it is often able to detect heat sources that are hidden from view
due to the heat that passes through the intermediate object. For example,
some "thermal imagers are capable of revealing the presence of human
forms near open windows or behind walls made of plywood or similar
material."'
Thermal imagers have proven useful in many different applications. FLIR
was originally developed for military surveillance and navigation. 2 But, since
47. See generally supra note 7 (definitions of "sensory-enhancement" and "passive").
48. Many imagers now have color displays. With these systems, heat is displayed in shades
ofred and cold in shades of green. See FLIR Systems, Inc., Vision: New Breakthroughs in Imaging
Systems (1998) (on file with author).
49. See Michael Smith, Overcome Your Misconceptions About Thermal Imaging, Test &
Measurement World Magazine (Oct. 1997), reprinted at FUR Systems, Inc., Articles (visited March
14, 1999) <http://www.flircomn/articles/testmeasure.htm>.
50. See FLIR Systems, Inc., Specifications for FLIR Agema I000LR (visited Sept. 12, 1998)
<http:/www.flir.com/products/military/10001r.htn>. Seven kilometers is approximately 4.3 miles.
51. United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1531 (W.D. Wis. 1994).
52. See Jonathan Todd Laba, f You Can't Stand the Heat, Get Out of the Drug Business:




becoming publicly available, it has been widely used in a variety of commercial
applications such as detecting defects in manufacturing equipment. s3 In
addition, FLIR is used to aid search-and-rescue operations and to locate fleeing
suspects and escaped convicts. 4 Firefighters use it to see through smoke in
burning buildings in order to locate people trapped inside." The United
States Border Patrol uses it to catch illegal immigrants." Power compa-
nies take advantage of the FLIR's heat-detecting capabilities to locate
overloaded wires and to monitor insulation efficiency.7 Environmental
agencies use it for activities such as forest fire detection, oil spill
detection, and wildlife management."9 And, the National Guard even used
a thermal imager to locate a young Bengal tiger that had escaped from
a circus.5 9
Law enforcement has also found thermal imagers to be useful in the
fight against illegal drugs. Many commercial marijuana growers cultivate*
their crops in the garages or basements of their homes using hydroponics
equipment." These operations often require powerful 1000-watt halide
lights which use large amounts of electricity and can produce temperatures
over 1500 Fahrenheit.6 The heat generated by these lights either escapes
naturally or is vented outside by the grower. Law enforcement officers
have discovered that thermal imagers can detect the excess heat emanating
from these homes. The officers view the suspect's home through the
imager and record its heat signatures. If the heat readings are abnormally
high compared to neighboring homes, the information is usually combined
with other evidence (such as power consumption records and tips from
confidential informants) to support an application for a warrant to search
the premises. 2
B. The Circuit Split
Many defendants have challenged the government's use of thermal imager
readings as evidence to support a search warrant. These defendants claim the use
53. See FLIR Systems, Inc., supra note 48.
54. See Laba, supra note 52, at 1450.
55. See Richard Boyd, Firefighters to Use Thermal Camera, New Orleans Times-Picayune,
Feb. 5, 1998, at H4.
56. See Laba, supra note 52, at 1450.
57. See Scott J. Smith, Note, Thermal Surveillance and the Extraordinary Device Exception:
Redefining the Scope of the Katz Analysis, 30 Val. U. L. Rev. 1071, 1081 n.68 (1996); FLIR
Systems, Inc., supra note 48.
.58. See Janice Fioravante, Night Sight, Investor's Bus. Daily, Feb. 26, 1995, at A6.
59. See Laba, supra note 52, at 1450.
60. Hydroponics is a method of cultivation in which plants are grown in nutrient-rich solutions
rather than soil. See Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 568 (10th ed. 1993).
61. See United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1057 (8th Cir. 1994).
62. See United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220, 221-24 (D. Haw. 1991).
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of the imager itself is a search and should not be conducted without a warrant
issued on independent probable cause. This question has not yet been addressed
by the Supreme Court of the United States. However, several United States
circuit courts of appeals have ruled on whether the pre-warrant use of a thermal
imager constitutes an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. Four
circuits have approved the pre-warrant use of thermal imagers: the Fifth Circuit
in United States v. Ishmael,"' the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Myers,"
the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Pinsons and the Eleventh Circuit in
United States v. Ford" and United States v. Robinson.67 However, two other
circuits have issued opinions reaching different conclusions. The Tenth
Circuit, in United States v. Cusumano, ruled that the pre-warrant use of
thermal imagers was unconstitutional. 6  Then, on rehearing, the opinion
was vacated because the court found independent probable cause.69 Later,
in United States v. Kyllo, the Ninth Circuit first ruled that the pre-warrant
use of thermal imagery was an unreasonable search.7" Then, on rehear-
ing, the court withdrew its original opinion and, in a 2-1 decision, held
that the thermal scan was not a "search" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment."'
These opinions demonstrate the difficulty courts have had with this
technology. Operating without the benefit of a direct ruling from the Supreme
Court, courts have looked to other Fourth Amendment decisions, like Katz, for
guidance. Unfortunately, these cases, and the rationales that have developed
from them, have been inadequate. As explained below, the rationales of the
federal circuit courts are flawed and the analogies made have been to cases with
distinguishable facts.
63. United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1995).
64. United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668 (7th Cit. 1995).
65. United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056 (8th Cit. 1994).
66. United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992 (11th Cit. 1994).
67. United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325 (1 Ith Cit. 1995).
68. United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497 (10th Cit. 1995), vacated, 83 F.3d 1247 (10th
Cit. 1996).
69. The court stated on rehearing, "[wle do not decide the constitutionality of the warrantless
use of the thermal imager to scan Defendants' residence because any such decision is unnecessary
to a resolution of Defendants' appeals." Cusumano, 83 F.3d at 1250. Despite the fact that the
opinion was vacated, the arguments made in Cusumano are still cited by other courts. Also,
Professor LaFave refers to this opinion as "the most exhaustive and compelling analysis of the use
of a thermal imager." 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth
Amendment § 2.2 (Supp. 1998). Thus, throughout the remainder of this comment, all references in
the text to Cusumano are to the original opinion, 67 F.3d 1497 (10th Cit. 1995).
70. United States v. Kyllo, 140 F.3d 1249 (9th Cit. 1998) (withdrawn and superceded by
United States v. Kyllo, 1999 WL 694733 (9th Cit. 9/9/1999)).
71. United States v. Kyllo, 1999 WL 694733 (9th Cir. 9/9/1999).
1999]
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C. The Flawed Rationales
1. Failure of the Katz Test
The first prong of the two-part Katz test requires that a person must have
"exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy."7 But, when applied
to thermal imagery cases, the courts have had trouble determining what actions
are necessary to satisfy this requirement. To illustrate, several seemingly simple
questions are posed below. The purpose of these questions is not necessarily to
support one theory over another, but instead to demonstrate that the current
rationales used by the courts have generated inconsistent answers.
Should deliberate ventilation of the heat from one's home preclude a finding
of a subjective expectation of privacy? Katz holds that "[w]hat a person
knowingly exposes to the public" is not protected by the Fourth Amendment."
Therefore, one can argue that an individual who deliberately vents heat from his
home is exposing that heat to the public.74 Thisreasoning weighed heavily in the
decisions in Pinson," Ford'6 and Myers." In each of these cases, the home-
owner deliberately vented the heat from his home or garage and the courts held
that no subjective expectation of privacy existed. As a corollary to this theory, it
could also be argued that one who does not vent the heat, but knows that it is
escaping and does nothing to impede its escape, likewise "knowingly exposes" that
heat. But, the practical result of this line of reasoning is that only two classes of
defendants in these cases would have been afforded Fourth Amendment protection:
those who were totally ignorant of the most findamental principles of thermody-
namics 8 and those who took affirmative actions to conceal the heat.
But, does Katz demand that a person take affirmative actions to contain the
heat or conceal its escape? Robinson held that, even though the heat was not
72. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,361, 88 S. Ct. 507,516(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
73. Id. at 351, 88 S. Ct. at 511.
74. "The defendant installed an exhaust fan which vented warm air from his [marijuana
growing operation). By doing so, he knowingly exposed exhaust vapors and heat to public
observation." United States v. Domitrovich, 852 F. Supp. 1460, 1473 (E.D. Wash. 1994).
75. "[T]here is no reasonable expectation of privacy in heat which Pinson voluntarily vented
'outside." United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1058 (8th Cir. 1994).
76. "Ford punched holes in the floor of his mobile home and forced the warmer air out using
an electric blower .... [Wie find that he did not seek to preserve the fact of that heat as private.
Thus, we conclude that Ford did not exhibit a subjective expectation of privacy in the heat emitted
by his mobile home." United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 995 (11 th Cir. 1994).
77. "Myers did not have a subjective expectation of privacy in the heat emitted. Myers took
-no steps to conceal or contain the heat emissions from his home. In fact, Myers discharged the heat
from his home through vents on his roof." United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668, 669 (7th Cir. 1995).
78. When you ask the question "How can you tell if a car has recently been driven?" a
common response will be "Feel the hood to see if it is warm." Such a response indicates that the
respondents understand the basic principles of thermodynamics-even if they are not able to explain
them in scientific terms. See also Michael L. Huskins, Comment, Marijuana Hot Spots: Infrared
Imaging and the Fourth Amendment, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 655, 669 (1996).
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intentionally vented, no subjective expectation of privacy existed because
Robinson had not taken affirmative steps to prevent the heat from escaping.79
Also, in Kyllo, the court found that the defendant "made no attempt to conceal
[the] emissions, demonstrating a lack of concern with the heat emitted and a lack
of a subjective privacy expectation in the heat." s" However, Charles Katz did
not take every possible precaution to protect against eavesdropping. Katz
conducted his conversation inside the phone booth, but took no steps to prevent
the vibrations of the glass which were recorded by the "bug" on the exterior of
the phone booth. Yet, the court still found that he had a subjective expectation
of privacy and disallowed the warrantless recording." Robinson and Kyllo
seem to articulate a requirement that a citizen take some affirmative step in order
to demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy in the emissions. However,
this affirmative action requirement was not intended by Katz and, in fact, would
have commanded a different result in Katz. 2 Contrary to Robinson and Kyllo,
and in line with Katz, two other cases, Ishmael" and Cusumano,4 both held
that a subjective expectation of privacy existed even though the defendants had
deliberately vented the heat outside their homes.
Another question raised is whether an individual's subjective expectation of
privacy should depend upon his knowledge of current surveillance technology.
Could a defendant argue that, although he was aware the heat was escaping from
his home, he was not aware of the government's monitoring capability and
therefore was unaware that he was exposing the heat to the public? If so, will
this, in effect, require law enforcement to publicize its new crime-fighting
equipment before putting it to use?
These basic questions illustrate only a few of the complications encountered
in thermal imagery cases when deciding whether an individual has satisfied the
first prong of the Katz test. Interestingly, all of these questions ignore an even
more fundamental issue: Cusumano maintains that the pertinent inquiry is not
whether there is an expectation of privacy in the escaping heat, but whether there
is an expectation of privacy in the activities within the home that generated the
79. "The focal issue is whether Robinson had a subjective expectation of privacy in the heat
generated by his indoor marijuana cultivation. We find none. While Robinson attempted to conceal
his marijuana growing operation by conducting it inside his home, the record does not indicate that
he affirmatively took any action to prevent the resulting heat from being emitted into the atmosphere
above his house." United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325, 1328-29 (11 th Cir. 1995) (emphasis
added).
80. United States v. Kyllo, 1999 WL 694733 (9th Cir. 9/9/1999).
81. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507 (1967).
82. "[Ulnless we intend to render Katz' first prong meaningless," we must reject the proposal
that the Ishmaels take every necessary precaution to demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy.
United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 854 (5th Cir. 1995).
83. "We must conclude that the Ishmaels exhibited a subjective expectation that their
hydroponic laboratory would remain private." Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 854.
84. "We think it plain under Katz and its progeny that the Defendants exhibited a subjective
expectation of privacy." United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1502 (1Oth Cir. 1995).
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heat.S In other words, this case points out that the true objective of the
government surveillance is not to determine whether there is excess heat escaping
from the home, but whether there is a marijuana growing operation located
within the confines of the home. Under this approach, whether heat is vented
becomes irrelevant and any marijuana grower who, for purposes of concealment,
moves his operation indoors will normally satisfy Katz's subjective requirement.
The varied conclusions reached in these cases demonstrate that the subjective
prong of the Katz test has been ineffective as a guide for the courts when applied
to issues involving the use of thermal imagery. To further complicate matters,
those courts that did acknowledge the existence of a subjective expectation of
privacy were then faced with the task of determining whether that expectation
was one society would recognize as reasonable. This task was no easier because
the courts also encountered significant problems in the application of the
objective prong of Katz.
Myers, Pinson, Robinson, Ford, and Kyllo all frame the "objectiveness"issue
in accordance with Oliver V. United States, which states that "the correct inquiry
is whether the government's intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal
values protected by the Fourth Amendment."86 If these values will be infringed
upon, then the defendant's expectation of privacy is reasonable. These cases all
stressed the non-intrusive nature of the thermal imager and four of them
specifically said that "[n]one of the interests which form the basis for the need
for protection of a residence, namely the intimacy, personal autonomy and
privacy associated with a home, are threatened by thermal imagery." ' But, as
Cusumano pointed out, these cases focus only on the heat emanating from the
home, not the activities within the home that generated the heat. Cusumano and
the dissent in Kyllo both focused on the fact that the activities generating the heat
occurred within the intimacy of the home and, as a result, concluded that the
expectation of privacy was reasonable."
This brief analysis illustrates the inadequacies of the Katz test when applied
to thermal imagery cases. As a result, the courts have been forced to make
strained and unrealistic analogies to the facts of other post-Katz cases. The
following discussion reviews the arguments used by the courts to support their
decisions and demonstrates that the rationales developed from these cases are also
flawed when applied to thermal imagery.
85. Cusumano, 67 F.3d at 1502.
86. Oliverv. United States, 466 U.S. 170,182-83, 104 S. Ct. 1735,1743 (1984); United States
v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668, 670 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1059 (8th Cir.
1994); United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325, 1329 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. Ford, 34
F.3d 992, 995 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. Kyllo, 1999 WL 694733 (9th Cir. 9/9/1999).
. 87. Myers, 46 F.3d at .670; Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1330; Ford, 34 F.3d at 997 (all quoting
Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1059). Kyllo also cites Pinson stating, "Such information is neither sensitive nor
personal, nor does it reveal the specific activities within the ... home." United States v. Kyllo,
1999 WL 694733 (9th Cir. 9/9/1999) (citing Plnson, 24 F.3d at 1059).




2. The "Waste Heat" Theory
United States v. Penny-Feeney,9 the first thermal imagery case addressed
by a federal court, is the seminal case for the "waste heat" theory. This theory
has been subsequently adopted by several of the circuit courts." The Penny-
Feeney court, after an in-depth examination of the FLIR's capabilities, found that
the device was limited to detecting differences in temperature only on the surface
of an object. Thus, it could detect the heat that was emanating from the exterior
of the structure; but, it could not detect heat inside the home. The court then
analogized the heat emanating from the defendant's home to the trash placed by
the curb in Greenwood." Therefore, applying the first prong of the Katz test,
the court held that the "defendants did not manifest an actual expectation of
privacy in the heat waste since they voluntarily vented [the heat] outside the
garage ... and [they] in no way attempted to impede its escape or exercise
dominion over it."92 Turning to the second prong of Katz, the court continued
its analogy to trash placed by the curb. Greenwood held that no objective
expectation of privacy existed because it is common knowledge that trash left on
the curb is "readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other
members of the public."93 Likewise, the Penny-Feeney court concluded that,
since the defendants' heat waste was exposed to the public, even if they "were
capable of demonstrating a subjective expectation of privacy in the heat waste,
... such an expectation would not be one that society would be willing to accept
as objectively reasonable." 94
This analogy, however, ignores fundamental factual distinctions. First,
taking out the trash requires affirmative action on behalf of the homeowner. If
he chooses, the homeowner can refrain from taking out the trash until time for
collection or he can arrange another method of disposal. On the other hand, a
homeowner has no choice whether heat dissipates from his home. This happens
without any action taken on his part and, in fact, will most likely occur despite
his best efforts because "[h]eat loss and heat conduction (or radiation) obey the
laws of physics and are not phenomena over which an individual customarily
exerts control.""5  For example, in Ishmael, the defendant constructed a
special concrete basement beneath a steel building and pumped in water from a
nearby pond for irrigation and cooling. However, law enforcement officers were
89. United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220 (D. Haw. 1991).
90. This theory has been adopted by the 7th Circuit (Myers, 46 F.3d at 670), the 8th Circuit
(Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1058), and the IIth Circuit (Ford, 34 F.3d at 997).
91. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 226 (citing Califomia v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 108 S.
Ct. 1625 (1987)).
92. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 226.
93. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40, 108 S. Ct. at 1628-29.
94. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 226 (citing Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 108 S. Ct. 1625).
95. United States v. Cusurnano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1508 (10th Cir. 1995).
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still able to detect elevated temperatures in the ground surrounding the
building. 6
Second, this analogy assumes that the homeowner is aware of the risk that
his heat will be monitored. While a homeowner may be aware of the risk that
someone may rummage through his trash, it is unlikely he is equally aware that
his home could be the subject of infrared surveillance. Without such recognition
of the risks, it seems improper to say that the homeowner "knowingly exposed"
his heat to the public.
Cusumano and the dissent in Kyllo both reject the waste heat theory because,
as mentioned above, they find that the proper focus should be on the heat-
generating activities that occur within the home, not the escaping heat, because
the purpose and utility of the imager is to reveal the heat signatures of objects
and activities occurring inside the structure.97 In fact, the true worth of the
device to the government is predicated upon translation of the heat readings into
information about the activities within the home that generated the heat.9' With
this perspective, these courts concluded that the waste-heat analogy was totally
inapplicable.
3. The Canine-Sniff Analogy
The Penny-Feeney court also compared thermal imagery to a canine-sniff as
used by the DEA agents in Place.99 Stressing the non-intrusive nature of the
thermal imager, the Penny-Feeney court commented that the heat emanations,
like odor emanations, could be detected in an inoffensive manner without
embarrassment to the person."° In addition, of utmost importance was the fact
that no physical invasion occurred and "[n]o intimate details connected with the
use of the home or curtilage were observed."' 0 ' This canine-sniff analogy was
endorsed by Myers,1 2 Pinson,03  Ford,104 Robinson,"5  Ishmael,' and
Kyllo107 and, consequently, all of these cases found that the second prong of
96. United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 851-52 (5th Cir. 1995).
97. "To focus upon the 'waste heat' radiating from a slucture is to ignore both the purpose of
the device and the manner in which it operates." Cusumano, 67 F.3d at 1501. "It is strange to focus
on the homeowner's non-existent expectation as to emissions." United States v. Kyllo, 1999 WL
694733 (9th Cir. 9/9/1999) (Noonan, J., dissenting).
98. See Cusumano, 67 F.3d at 1501.
99. United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220,228 (D. Haw. 1991) (citing United States
v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880 (1976), a Ninth Circuit case which, like United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696,
103 S. CL 2637 (1983), approved the pre-warrant use of dog-sniffs to search for narcotics).
100. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 227.
101. Id. at 228.
102. United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668, 670 (7th Cir. 1995).
103. United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1058 (8th Cir. 1994).
104. United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 997 (11 th Cir. 1994).
105. United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325, 1330 (11 th Cir. 1995).
106. United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 856 (5th Cir. 1995).
107. United States v. Kyllo, 1999 WL 694733 (9th Cir. 9/9/1999).
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Katz was not satisfied. The focus of the discussion in these cases often turned
on the kind of information revealed by the search. For example, the Pinson
court commented that "[t]he detection of the heat waste was not an intrusion into
the home; no intimate details of the home were observed, and there was no
intrusion upon the privacy of the individuals within."
108
This analogy, however, ignores a key factor in the Place decision. The
Place court emphasized the fact that a canine-sniff discloses only the presence
or absence of contraband items. It does not reveal any other information to law
enforcement. However, a thermal imager is not so limited. It can reveal other
details of the interior of the home. For example, in a Wisconsin case, "the
imager recorded the thermal energy emitted by a dehumidifier inside a closet
within defendant's residence. The imager did not reveal that the heat emitting
source was a dehumidifier, but it did reveal facts about activities within the
house: the fact of the heat emission and its general location."' 9 Some thermal
imagers could just as easily reveal two commingled bodies through a bedroom
window."' Due to this significant difference between thermal imagery and
canine sniffs, the Wisconsin court (as well as other courts..) found that the
canine-sniff analogy was inapplicable.
4. The Intimate Details Factor
The phrase "intimate details" was first used in a majority opinion in Dow
Chemical'"2 where the court commented that the photographs taken by the EPA
were "not so revealing of intimate details as to raise constitutional concerns.. '".3
Subsequent courts have focused on this language as a factor in evaluating thermal
imagery. However, the courts' use of this rationale has been inconsistent.
Several courts declared that the use of a thermal imager was permitted because
no intimate details were actually revealed when it was used.' Cusumano,
108. Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1059.
109. United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1519 (W.D. Wis. 1994).
110. It would not be extremely "difficult to identify (if not, strictly speaking, to watch) two
people making love in the privacy of their darkened bedroom." United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d
1497, 1504 and n.1 (lOth Cir. 1995).
I t1. United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1995); and United States v. Cusumano, 67
F.3d 1497 (10th Cir. 1995).
112. See Merrick D. Bernstein, "Intimate Details": A Troubling New Fourth Amendment
Standard For Government Surveillance Techniques, 46 Duke L.J. 575, 583 (1996) (discussing Dow
Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986)).
113. Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 238, 106 S. Ct. at 1827 (emphasis added).
114. "No revelation of intimate, even definitive, detail within the house was detectable." United
States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325, 1330 (11 th Cir. 1995); "No intimate details connected with the
use of the home or curtilage were observed." United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220, 228
(D. Haw. 1991). "While this technology may, in other circumstances, be or become advanced to the
point that its use will step over the edge from permissible non-intrusiVe observation into
impermissible warrantless search, we find no violation of the Fourth Amendment on these facts."
United v. Kyllo, 1999 WL 694733 (9th Cir. 9/9/1999).
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however, found the use of thermal imagery unconstitutional simply because it
was capable of revealing such details." 5
The "intimate details" factor was critical to the Fifth Circuit's analysis in
Ishmael and the Ninth Circuit's analysis in Kyllo. The Fifth Circuit, after rejecting
both the waste-heat and canine-sniff analogies, concluded that Ishmael had
exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy when he moved his marijuana
growing operation to the basement of a steel building constructed in a secluded
area.1 6  Then, turning to the second prong of Katz, the court utilized the
"intimate details" theory and ruled that Ishmael's expectation was not one that
society would recognize as reasonable."' For guidance, the court relied upon
Dow Chemical which stated that the government should not be "foreclosed from
using technology to enhance its surveillances, provided that that technology does
not reveal 'intimate details.'"""i When a search does not reveal intimate details
of the home, it "does not intrude in any way into the privacy and sanctity of a
home.""' 9 Thus, it does not infringe upon the personal and societal values
protected by the Fourth Amendment.' ° The Ninth Circuit stated in Kyllo,
"Much like the Fifth Circuit, we believe that, in evaluating whether technology has
been used to aid in permissible observation or to perform an impermissible
warrantless search, the 'crucial inquiry, as in any search and seizure analysis, is
whether the technology reveals intimate details."""' Since the scan "did not
expose any intimate details of Kyllo's life," the court could not "concludethat this
surveillance was so revealing of intimate details as to raise constitutional
concerns."'
122
The problem lies in the fact that no cases have specificallyattemptedto define
or establish any test to determine which details are "intimate" and which are not.
In fact, Justice Brennan asked in Florida v. Riley, "What, one wonders, is meant
by 'intimate details'?"'2 3 Where should the line be drawn? Must the thermal
115. "[Tihe thermal imager used here is quite plainly capable of revealing rather specific
information regarding the internal activities of the home." United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497,
1504 (10th Cir. 1995). Also, the Kyllo court in its original opinion concluded the details that can
be "unveiled by a thermal imager are sufficiently 'intimate' to give rise to a Fourth Amendment
violation" and pointed out, as an example, that "[i]t is not disputed whether the Agema 210 could
reveal details such as intimate activities in a bedroom." United States v. Kyllo, 140 F.3d 1249, 1254(9th Cir. 1998), withdrawn and superceded by United States v. Kyllo, 1999 WL 694733 (9th Cir.
9/9/1999).
116. United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 854-55 (5th Cir. 1995).
117. Id. at 855-57.
I 18. Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 855 (second emphasis added) (citing Dow Chemical Co. v. United
States, 476 U.S. 227, 238, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 1827 (1986)).
119. Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 856 (citing United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668, 669 (7th Cir. 1995)).
120. The court framed the issue as "whether the government's intrusion infringes upon the
personal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment" and then held that the "use of a
thermal imager in this case was not an unconstitutional search." Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 855, 857.
121. United States v. Kyllo, 1999 WL 694733 (9th Cir. 9/9/1999).
122. Id.
123. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 463, 109 S. Ct. 693, 703 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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imager record human activity within the home? Or could lesser details be
sufficient to implicate the Fourth Amendment? Without a bright-line standard,
law enforcement has no way to know what conduct is proscribed before a search
is conducted. The unacceptable result is that Fourth Amendment issues are being
decided by an ex post facto review of whether the search turned up "alarmingly
personal information"' 4-rather than whether the activity itself constitutes a
search. 2 s Also, it is questionable whether an "intimate details" inquiry is even
appropriate. Justice Brennan asked in his dissent in Florida v. Riley: "[W]here
in the Fourth Amendment or in our cases is there any warrant for imposing a
requirement that the activity observed must be 'intimate' in order to be protected
by the Constitution?"'26
Judge Noonan, dissenting in Kyllo, was also critical of use of the "intimate
details" dicta in Dow Chemical as a Fourth Amendment test. The focus should be
on the activity itself and not on whether "sensitive or personal" information was
revealed. To illustrate, he points out that, under the intimate details theory, "if
your home was searched by a blind policeman you would have suffered no
constitutional deprivation."''
5. The Publicly Available Factor
The "publicly available" factor also originated in Dow Chemical. In dicta, the
court commented that "[i]t may well be... that surveillance of private property
by using highly sophisticatedsurveillance equipment notgenerallyavailable to the
public.., might be constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant."' 28 The aerial
mapping camera used by the EPA cost over $22,000 and was described as the
124. United States v. Cusumano, 83 F.3d 1247, 1254 (10th Cir. 1996) (McKay, Circuit Judge,
dissenting in part and concurring in part).
125. See Bernstein, supra note 112, at 577-78.
126. Riley, 488 U.S. at 463, 109 S. CL at 703-04 (Brennan, J., dissenting). "Intimate details"
could be defined as any details that cannot be observed through visual surveillance. This definition
could be supported by United States v. Karo because one interpretation of Karo is that it establishes
the principle that "the revelation of a single detail about the interior of the home ... suffice[s] to
violate the Fourth Amendment." Cusumano, 67 F.3d at 1508 (interpreting United States v. Karo, 468
U.S. 705, 104 S. CL 3296 (1984)). This interpretation is based upon the statement in Karo that
"[tihe monitoring of an electronic device such as a beeper is, of course, less intrusive than a full-scale
search, but it does reveal a critical fact about the interior of the premises that the Government is
extremely interested in knowing." Karo, 468 U.S. at 715, 104 S. Ct. at 3303. This narrow
definition, in effect, renders the adjective "intimate" superfluous and relieves Justice Brennan's
concerns. Also, if this definition succeeds in establishing a bright-line rule that is adequate to inform
law enforcement ahead of time whether their conduct is proscribed, the problem of cx post facto
review may also be resolved. For a more in-depth discussion of the intimate details factor, see
Bernstein, supra note 112.
127. United States v. Kyllo, 1999 WL 694733 (9th Cir. 9/9/1999) (Noonan, J., dissenting).




"finest precision aerial camera available."'' 9 Yet, the court implied that it was
a "publicly available" device.130  Comparatively, thermal imagers are now
commonly used in a wide variety of applications and a new handheld thermal
image camera/recorder can be purchased for $12,950. 31 Therefore, under Dow
Chemical's definition of the term, thermal imagers would certainly qualify as
"equipment generally available to the public."
Literally, Dow Chemical only states that technology not commonly available
might be proscribed. But, several courts seem to have reasoned a contrario sensu
that searches using commonly available technology are not proscribed. As a
result, some courts have cited Dow Chemical in support of their conclusions that
pre-warrant thermal imagery is constitutional.'
The underlying premise of the "publicly available" theory is that once a
technology becomes widely available, its use is no longer proscribed because an
individual's expectation ofprivacy against that method of surveillance is no longer
acceptedby society. However, this theory seems to create a descending Orwellian
spiral " in which the privacy of the home would "hinge upon the outcome of a
technological race of measure/counter-measure between the average citizen and
the government-a race ... that the people will surely lose."' 34 The Cusumano
court stated that technological wizardry should neither obviate nor supplant a
warrant and that the government's use of technology must be constantly evaluated
in light of the Fourth Amendment "not because the Constitution constrains the
government to employ antiquated surveillance techniques but because the march
of science over the course of this century has time and again laid bare secrets that
society had (erroneously) assumed to lie safely beyond the perception of the
government."'
13 5
Consider, for example, parabolic microphones. They are widely used and can
be seen on the sidelines of any televised football game. Additionally, anyone can
purchase a parabolic microphone over the internet for less than $700.00.3
Therefore, they meet the definition of "publicly available." Yet, should
government officials who do not have the probable cause necessary to obtain a
warrant for "bugging" or "wiretapping" of a home be able to utilize a parabolic
129. Id. at 242 n.4, 106 S. Ct. at 1829 n.4 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
130. See id. at 238, 106 S. Ct. at 1827.
131. See FLIR Systems. Inc.. Agema 510 (visited March 14, 1999)
<http://www.flir.com/productsapps/AGEMA510.htm>.
132. "Dow Chemical provides useful guidance for search and seizure cases involving surveillance
technology." United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 855 (5th Cir. 1995).
133. "One can imagine an Orwellian spiral in which increased surveillance causes diminished
privacy expectations, which legitimize further surveillance, and on and on-until the entire Fourth
Amendment unravels." Laba, supra note 52, at 1474.
134. United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1504 (10th Cir. 1995).
135. Id. at 1505.




microphone to obtain the same information by sitting in a car on the street and
pointing the microphone at an open window of the suspect's home? Under the
"publicly available"theory, use of the parabolic microphone in this manner would
be permissible. Yet, it is generally recognized that such use is proscribed.'37 It
seems obvious that the ramifications of acceptance of the court's dicta in Dow
Chemical as a valid Fourth Amendment standard are unacceptable. Clearly, this
inquiry should not be part of the analysis of the constitutionality of government
searches.
6. Summary
Analysis of the rationales used in these thermal imaging cases clearly
illustrates that courts are straining to put a square peg in a round hole. Thermal
imagery and other passive, sensory-enhancing technologies are different from
anything previously addressed by the Supreme Court. As a result, lower courts
have been unable to address the constitutional issues raised by this new surveil-
lance method by analogy to prior Supreme Court cases. The following section,
however, proposes a better method for analyzing these cases.
IV. PROPOSED STANDARDS FOR EVALUATING THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SEARCHES
A. Introduction
The Katz test, although difficult to apply because it is not a bright-line rule,
has been favored by the courts because of its flexibility-it allows the law to
change with time.' But, this flexibility has, in effect, made Fourth Amendment
doctrine like a Rorschach inkblot-subject to each court's individual perceptions
of what society accepts as reasonable. Ironically, the Supreme Court itself
"repeatedly has acknowledged the difficulties created for courts, police, and
citizens by an ad hoc, case-by-case definition of Fourth Amendment standards to
be applied in differing factual circumstances."' 39 The Supreme Court has also
stated that the lawfulness of a search should not turn upon a "highly sophisticated
set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the drawing
of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions."'"" Yet, despite recognition of these
problems, few guidelines have been provided. There is, however, a better solution
that will adequatelyprotect the citizens'privacy rights. This solution can be found
in the majority opinion of Katz and in the text of the Fourth Amendment itself.
137. "[A] goverment official may not replicate a trick of the wind with a parabolic
microphone." Cusumano, 67 F.3d at 1505.
138. David H. Steinberg, Constructing Homes for the Homeless? Searching for a Fourth
Amendment Standard, 41 Duke LJ. 1508, 1520 (1992).
139. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1743 (1984).
140. Id. (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 2863 (1981)).
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B. A Closer Look at Katz
Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz declared that the Fourth Amendment
protects only those subjective expectations of privacy that "society is willing to
recognize as 'reasonable."""' On first impression, Justice Harlan's two-part
test seems to be a refinement of the original question left open by the text of the
Fourth Amendment: "what is reasonable?" However, there is a subtle, but
extremely significant, difference between the Fourth Amendment requirement of
reasonableness and Justice Harlan's test. The Fourth Amendment protects against
"unreasonable searches and seizures." Thus, the question to be asked is whether
the government activity-the search or seizure-is reasonable. However, the
second prong of Justice Harlan's test reverses the focus from whether the
government's action is reasonable to whether the citizen's expectation of privacy
is reasonable. In effect, this shifts the burden of proof from the government to
the citizen to prove "reasonableness." Now, instead of the government having
to justify its actions, the citizen is forced to prove that his expectation is one
society recognizes as reasonable.
C. The Proposal
1. Shifting the Burden Back to the Government
The Supreme Court should abandon Justice Harlan's test and re-focus on the
process used in the majority opinion of Katz. The majority opinion analyzed the
issue by first deciding whether the government conducted a search and then by
determining whether the search was reasonable. This is the proper method of
analysis-a method the Court should re-adopt.
With respect to whether a search had occurred, the majority wrote that
"the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not
a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve
as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutional-
ly protected."" This language is a specific rejection of the trespass
doctrine and an expansion and redefinition of the concepts of search and
seizure to include intangibles such as communications. There is no mention in
the majority opinion of objective "reasonableness" with respect to the indivi-
dual's expectation of privacy. Thus, the majority seems to characterize a
"search" simply as any government activity that is calculated to reveal
information which an individual sought to preserve as private (did not knowingly
expose to the public).
141. United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S. Ct. 507, 516 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
142. Id. at 351, 88 S. CL at 511 (internal citations omitted).
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Once the majority determined a search had occurred, the burden shifted to the
government. The majority wrote that "searches conducted outside the judicial
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions. """ Therefore, the burden was placed upon the
government to prove that the search fell within an established exception. Since
this could not be proven, the searchwas "unreasonable"and, therefore, unconstitu-
tional.
Other commentators have also argued that, in lieu of Justice Harlan's two-part
test, an approach like this one-where the focus is on the government activity
rather than the individual's expectations-is more appropriate.'" But, so far,
the Court has refused to accept this argument. One reason for the Court's
reluctance may be the fear that, by placing the burden of proof on the government,
legitimate law enforcement efforts could be excessively hindered.
However, one must consider the serious potential for government abuse
inherent in technology like thermal imagery. Passive, sensory-enhanced
surveillance devices pose a unique threat to the public because there is no notice
to the subject that surveillance has been conducted. Normally, a person suspected
of criminal activity is presented with a search warrant at the time of the
search-or, if not home at the time, he is made aware that a search occurred when
he returns home and finds his possessions disturbed. However, with passive,
sensory-enhancedsurveillance, there is no notice that a search has been conducted.
Without this notice, warrantless searches could be conducted with practically
no government accountability. Notice operates to restrict government activity
because if the "community learns of too many mistakes or unjustified searches
by the police, the community probably will find other police officers to handle
its law enforcement duties."'45 Also, civil suits are normally available to those
individuals who have been subjected to constitutional violations. However, no
adequate remedy exists if the suspects never become aware that a search has
occurred.' Without these remedies, the police will be "far less hesitant to
engage in questionable, arbitrary, or inappropriate sense-enhanced searches."' 47
Some commentators have even argued that "undisclosed searches may have a
'chilling effect' on first amendment rights" because they may reduce an
individual's willingness to freely express himself due to constant fear of
surveillance.' For these reasons, some type of notice, regardless of the form
it takes, is needed in order to prevent arbitrary government searches.
143. Id. at 357, 88 S. Ct. at 514.
144. See Bruce G. Berner, The Supreme Court and the Fall of the Fourth Amendment, 25 Val.
U. L. Rev. 383 (1991).




148. Id. at 570-71.
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Congress recognized this need when it passed.the federal wiretap statute. 149
But, currently there is no such federal legislative requirement for thermal
imaging and other similar technologies.5 0 Therefore, the task of preventing
the government from using this technology to conduct arbitrary searches is left
solely to the courts.
The most effective method for protecting against abuse would be for the
Supreme Court to totally abandon Justice Harlan's two-pronged test and return
the burden of proof to the government to demonstrate the reasonableness of all
searches. However, if the Court finds this step too drastic, it should at least
recognize the unique potential for abuse that is inherent in passive, sensory-
enhanced surveillance and implement a new standard solely applicable to the use
of that technology. The Court should, as the majority in Katz demonstrated,
declare such warrantless searches presumptively unreasonable and place the
burden on the government to overcome this presumption. The government
would then be required to prove that the activity falls within an established
jurisprudential exception.
It is obviously necessary to find an acceptable balance between the quest for
law and order and the protection of individual privacy. Therefore, any guidelines
established by the court must be sufficiently flexible so that legitimate law
enforcement efforts to combat crime are not unduly hindered. This goal can be
accomplished under the proposed standard by evaluating whether some over-
whelming governmental interest exists. To make this determination, a balancing
test can be employed in which the privacy interest of the individual is weighed
against the potential value to the public of the government activity. This type
of balancing test is common throughout constitutional law and lower courts are
familiar with its application. In many previous cases, courts have recognized that
there are situations where an overwhelming governmental interest may justify
intrusions into individual privacy that would not otherwise be acceptable.
Described below are some of these established jurisprudential exceptions. Also
outlined below are some additional exceptions that may be established by courts
in the future. These examples demonstrate that this proposal does not excessive-
ly restrain legitimate government activity. Instead, this proposal merely shifts
the burden of proof in order to protect citizens against developing technologies
until such time as the government demonstrates that the use of those technolo-
gies, absent some prevailing government interest, is not violative of individual
rights to privacy.
.149. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1993). Section 2518(8Xd) requires that, no later than ninety days after
termination of the wiretap, the persons under surveillance shall receive notice of the surveillance, on
what dates it occurred, and whether any communications were intercepted.
150. In fact, a similar statute is not practical with respect to technology such as thermal imagery.
A wiretap requires a warrant based upon probable cause before the surveillance can be commenced.
However, in the case of thermal imagery, if probable cause could be shown, the officers would




2. Airport, Courthouse and Border Exceptions
Courts have acknowledged that the privacy rights of an individual in an
airport may be diminished due to the public concern for preventing terrorism or
air piracy.' The fact that one instance of air piracy can result in hundreds of
deaths and the destruction of millions of dollars of property makes even minor
intrusions, such as having one's luggage X-rayed, reasonable. Similarly, this
type of exception has been recognized with respect to courthouse' and
border' 3 searches.
A new type of passive, sensory-enhancing device, called Millivision,'"4
may be particularly attractive to law enforcement in these situations. The
Millivision gun detectors register the millimeter waves naturally emitted from the
human body. The millimeter waves easily pass through clothing, but not through
denser objects like guns. Therefore, if a person carrying a gun passes in front
of a millimeter wave camera, an outline of the gun will show up as an anomaly
on the operator's display screen. The resolution of these devices is precise
enough that trained operators are capable of distinguishing items such as guns
from harmless things like coins or ink pens. One concern, however, is that
Millivision also provides the operator with a fairly detailed outline of the
person's body. As the resolution of millimeter wave devices continues to
improve, a point may be reached where the information provided to the operator
about the person's body is of such a personal character that the intrusion is no
longer justified-even by the heightened governmental interest. For example, a
new device known as a radar skin scanner is capable of producing images so
precise that the operator is able to tell whether or not a male subject has been
circumcised.'"5 Such an extreme invasion into one's privacy cannot be justified
except in the rarest of circumstances.
On the other hand, if the resolution is high enough that guns and other
weapons can be automatically detected with an extremely high degree of
accuracy by computer software then it would become unnecessary to generate
detailed images of the subject's body. In such a case, the use of Millivision gun
detectors may then fall into another exception discussed below, the exception for
binary searches.
151. 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 10.6 (3d
ed. 1996).
152. "Detention and search procedures of varying proportions are now employed in courthouses
throughout the country." Kenneth L. Jesmore, The Courthouse Search, 21 UCLA L. Rev. 797, 799
(1974).
153. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976).
154. Millivision is a brand name for the millimeter wave technology developed by Millimerix
Corporation. See Laura B. Riley, Concealed Weapon Detectors and the Fourth Amendment: The
Constitutionality of Remote Sense-Enhanced Searches, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 281, 283 (1997).
155. Mark Hansen, No Place To Hide: If crime is everywhere, so, too, may be police
surveillance cameras and contraband detection devices to combat it. But, who's looking out for
privacy rights?, 83 A.B.A. J. 45, 46 (Aug. 1997).
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3. Exigency Exceptions
The potential uses of passive, sensory-enhancing devices in exigency
situations are numerous. For example, in hostage situations, the exigency
exception could be invoked to allow officials to use either thermal imagery or
Millivision to pinpoint the exact location within a building of the person holding
the hostages. In fact, FLIR proved useful to the FBI in Waco to determine
which rooms in the Branch Davidian complex were occupied.'56 These
technologies could also be used prior to execution of an arrest warrant where a
no-knock entry is authorized. Police could use the technology to conduct a
limited scan of the entire home prior to entry to determine the number and
location of all individuals inside. This would dramatically reduce the risks to
police officers and damage to the arrestee's property.
4. The Terry-Stop Exception
Some commentators have argued that there may also be Terry-type applica-
tions where passive, sensory-enhancing technology could be used under
constraints of limited duration and scope. If this exception, based upon Terry v.
Ohio,"7 is allowed, the devices could be used only for the purpose of confirm-
ing an observation already made by non-enhanced senses that gives one a
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot or that the suspect may
possess a weapon. Other commentators, in addition to this author, believe that
the Terry doctrine, once applied to passive, sensory-enhanced surveillance, could
be dangerously expansive and its ramifications should be thoroughly considered
by the courts before adoption.'
5. The Binary Search Exception
A binary search'59 tells authorities only two things: "yes" or "no." A
binary search exception would allow sensory-enhancement to be used if the
information obtained from the device was limited strictly to the existence or non-
156. FBI Kept Tabs On Cult With High-Tech Gear, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Apr. 21, 1993, at
12A.
157. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct 1868 (1968) allows an officer to temporarily detain
an individual for questioning when he has a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Also,
if the officer has reason to believe that the individual is armed with a dangerous weapon, then he
may conduct a limited physical search for weapons.
158. For a more thorough discussion of the pros and cons of allowing such an exception, see
David A. Harris, Superman's X-Ray Vision and the Fourth Amendment: The New Gun Detection
Technology, 69 Temp. L. Rev. 1, 51-55 (1996).
159. Term used in United States v. Colyer, 878 F.2d 469, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1989) to describe the




existence of illegal activity or contraband. However, if the device conveys to
authorities any other information, its use should be prohibited. Therefore, to fall
under this exception, any information conveyed by the device must lead to no
other conclusion than that of illegal activity.
While this exception has not been officially recognized by any courts, it can
be supported by the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Place.'1" In
Place, the officer's senses were enhanced by the use of a canine which gave the
officer limited information only as to the presence or absence of narcotics. The
justification for establishing this exception and declaring all binary searches such
as the canine sniff "reasonable" is based upon the fact that the intrusion is of
such a limited nature that the individual's privacy interests are easily overcome
by the governmental interest in preventing crime. The potential benefits to law
enforcement outweigh this minimal intrusion to the individual.'
To further illustrate, consider a Millivision gun detector with a very high
resolution. Due to the intimate personal information it may reveal to the
operator about the subject's body, its use may be proscribed-even in airport
situations. However, if the resolution was such that computer software could
identify guns with an extremely high degree of accuracy, their use might be
allowed. To qualify as a "binary search" the device's software would have to
be designed to set off an alarm or display the image on the operator's screen
only if it positively identified a gun. 6" A perfectly discriminating Millivision
gun detector might even be used by police on city streets where it is illegal to
carry a concealed weapon. However, gun detectors could not be used where
concealed weapons permits are issued because the information obtained from the
device must lead to no other conclusion other than that of illegal activity.
These are only a few of the potential applications under this exception. The
hurdle for surveillance technology manufacturers, however, would be to design
the devices so that they are perfectly discriminating. Current thermal imagers
would not fall into this exception because they cannot discriminate between legal
and illegal heat sources. However, as technology develops, this exception could
become particularly useful to law enforcement. In addition, public opposition
would be minimal because absolutely no private information would be revealed
to law enforcement officers unless the individual was in fact breaking the law.
160. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983).
161. For arguments against this exception, see Harris, supra note 158, at 51-53 and United States
v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 133, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1667 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
162. Prior to establishment of this exception the courts would have to resolve several serious
questions: Is 95% accuracy in the machine acceptable? 80%? Would establishment of this
exception result in a reduction of probable cause determinations to mathematical formulae? Such a
result would seem contrary to the Court's assertion that the determination of probable cause must be
a "totality of the circumstances" decision because it is a "fluid concept" that includes many
unmeasurable factors such as the experience of the officer. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-32,
103 S. Ct. 2317, 2328-29 (1983). See also George Dery Ill, Remote Frisking Down To The Skin:
Government Searching Technology Powerful Enough To Locate Holes In Fourth Amendment




Courts have had difficulty resolving the constitutional issues raised by
passive, sensory-enhanced surveillance with any measure of consistency. To help
remedy this problem, the Supreme Court should seize the opportunity presented
by the recent thermal imagery cases and establish a new standard for evaluating
this kind of technology. Ideally, the court should abandon Justice Harlan's
subjective-objective test and return the burden of proof to the government to
demonstrate the "reasonableness" of its actions. Alternatively, due to the
inherent lack of notice and resulting potential for abuse, the Court should at least
shift the burden of proof with respect to passive, sensory-enhanced surveillance.
Under this new standard, the courts should conduct a two-part inquiry. First,
they should determine whether a search has occurred-that is, whether the
government activity was designed to reveal information that the individual
subjectively sought to preserve as private. Second, the courts should determine
whether the government has met its burden of proving that the search falls within
a jurisprudential exception to the presumption of unreasonableness. These
exceptions are established when the courts, after balancing the interests of the
individual against the interests of the government, determine that some over-
whelming governmental interest exists.
This proposal does not purport to eliminate all controversies raised by this
technology, but it does provide a more stable structure within which the courts
can conduct their analyses. One benefit is that the established exceptions will
operate to provide prior notice to officers as to what conduct is unacceptable.
Also, this proposal eliminates the Orwellian results created by the objective
prong of Katz. And finally, this proposal avoids the "intimate details" inquiry
that requires an ex post facto review of whether the search revealed alarmingly
personal information.
Surely, there will still be questions as to whether a certain activity falls
within a specific exception. However, the courts are familiar with this type of
balancing test and should be able to answer those questions in a consistent
manner. Most importantly, under this proposal, any "close calls" go to the
citizen-not the government-because the burden of proof has been returned to
its proper place.
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